We analyze a class of sender-receiver games with quadratic payo¤s, which includes the communication games in Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008) as special cases, for which the receiver's maximum expected payo¤ when players have access to arbitrary, mediated communication protocols is attained in one-round of face-to-face, unmediated cheap talk. This result is based on the existence for these games of a communication equilibrium with an in…nite number of partitions of the state space. We provide explicit expressions for the maximum expected payo¤ of the receiver, and illustrate its use by deriving new comparative statics of the quality of optimal communication. For instance, a shift in the underlying uncertainty that reduces expected con ‡ict can worsen the quality of communication.
Introduction
Con ‡icting interests often hinder communication between informed experts and uninformed decision makers. This is certainly the case in Crawford and Sobel's classic contribution where an informed sender strategically sends costless messages to an uninformed receiver, i.e. the sender engages in cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel, (CS) 1982) . CS considers one-shot communication: the sender makes a single recommendation and the receiver immediately makes a decision based on that recommendation. The fact that the sender can foresee the e¤ect of his in ‡uence, by anticipating how each recommendation will be interpreted and which decision it will induce, implies that perfect information transmission is not credible.
The literature has since studied several communication protocols that improve the ef…ciency of the one-shot equilibria in CS, for instance, by engaging in repeated rounds of communication (Krishna and Morgan, 2004) , by using a noisy channel (Blume, Board and Kawamura, 2007) , by appealing to a correlation device on which to base the encoding and decoding of messages (Blume, 2012) or, more generally, by relying on a trustworthy, or even strategic, mediator (Goltsman, Horner constant bias between sender and receiver and a uniformly distributed state. We extend the analysis of GHPS to a broader class of sender-receiver games and study the structure of the 1 The role of mediation with …nite messages is considered in Ganguly and Ray (2012) . Ambrus et al (2010) examine hierarchical cheap talk where the messages get passed through a sequence of agents and show that mixed-strategy equilibria can exist that dominate the direct communication game.
payo¤ set supported by communication equilibria.
Our main result is a characterization of a class of sender-receiver games for which there exists a one-shot, unmediated communication equilibrium for which the receiver's expected payo¤ cannot be improved upon by using arbitrary mediation rules (Proposition 2). That is, for these games the receiver obtains no e¢ ciency gains from prolonged conversations, using noisy channels or arbitrary mediation; brief conversations are optimal. In particular, the cheap talk equilibrium that achieves the maximum of the receiver's payo¤ supports an in…nite number of di¤erent decisions. That is, brief conversations that are optimal are also very detailed. Importantly, the class of sender-receiver games for which this is true includes the communication games in Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008) ,
where the bias between the sender and the receiver is linear and increasing and vanishes at some point of the state space. 2 One lesson from GHPS is that the gains from mediation with respect to the most e¢ cient equilibrium in CS are highest for intermediate levels of con ‡ict. Indeed, as the con ‡ict vanishes one-shot communication approaches full revelation while intensifying the con ‡ict leads to no information transmission, even in the presence of a mediator. Our results show, however, that it is not only the magnitude of the con ‡ict that determines the gains from mediation but also its shape. Indeed, Proposition 2 imposes no constraints on the average con ‡ict (as measured by the expected bias between the sender and the receiver). Therefore, for any level of expected con ‡ict one can …nd a sender-receiver game in our setup where the receiver does not gain from mediation.
Apart from the insights on the gains from mediation, this result has also a more practical appeal. The cheap talk model in CS, and speci…cally their leading example, has been a workhorse model in applications featuring costless communication, where the restriction to one-shot communication has often been defended on tractability grounds. A concern with this approach, however, is that the insights derived in such settings may not be robust to the parties agreeing to switch to welfare-improving communication protocols. However, for the class of games and the one-shot in…nite equilibrium in those games identi…ed in Proposition 2, the receiver cannot strictly gain from having access to a neutral mediator. This implies, 2 See also Alonso (2007) and Gordon (2010 The basic logic of the analysis is as follows. First, the revelation principle allows us to restrict attention to games where the sender privately and truthfully discloses the state to a mediator, who in turn issues a recommendation to the receiver which the latter is willing to follow. The need to ensure the sender's sincerity and the receiver's obedience implies that, for games with quadratic payo¤s, interim and ex-ante payo¤s can be expressed as linear functionals of state-contingent average decisions (Lemma 1). From this representation we identify a class of games for which a tight relationship exists between local and global properties of the communication equilibria: the interim payo¤ to the sender for either the lowest or the highest type is a linear function of the ex-ante payo¤ to the sender or the receiver (Proposition 1). Therefore globally optimal communication equilibria must also be locally optimal for either the highest or the lowest type of sender. We then show that if the sender and the receiver are perfectly aligned for either the highest or the lowest state, then there exists a one-shot in…nite communication equilibrium such that communication is very detailed around the state of perfect alignment. In particular, an extreme type of sender is able to fully reveal his type, and thus to obtain his preferred decision with certainty.
Since local properties of extreme types translate to global properties for these games, perfect communication for an extreme type implies that this communication equilibrium is also exante optimal for the receiver. Moreover, this logic then naturally extends to settings where the point of alignment is interior, when we can split the communication game around this point of alignment Our paper follows the recent literature that analyzes the gains from adopting more sophisticated communication protocols in sender-receiver games. The paper most related to ours is GHPS, who studies di¤erent con ‡ict resolution procedures, among them optimal mediation. While we expand their methodology to a broader class of games, our focus is on characterizing the class of games where one-shot communication is optimal. Ivanov (2013) provides su¢ cient conditions for mediation to be valuable, that is, for the receiver to bene…t at all from communicating with the sender. Finally, Blume (2012) is also concerned with optimal mediation involving one-shot communication. In particular, Blume (2012) shows that the e¢ ciency bound reported by GHPS for the leading example in CS can be achieved in one-shot communication if parties can rely on a correlation device that sends private signals before the sender becomes informed. 3 In contrast, in our paper optimal communication is face-to-face and does not rely on the use of a correlation device.
The Model
There are two players, the informed sender (he) and the uninformed receiver (she). The 
where y S ( ) is a di¤erentiable function of the state. In our speci…cation, the sender's preferred action matches the realized state while the receiver's preferred action is y S ( ), where the bias b ( ) = y S ( ) measures the distance between the sender's and the receiver's preferred choices. Apart from the di¤erentiability requirement, we don't impose any additional assumptions on the shape of y S ( ). In particular, for our representation in Lemma 1 we don't require y S ( ) to be non-decreasing.
While the sender observes ; the receiver has authority over the action y: Prior to the receiver selecting an action, the players exchange messages according to a …xed communication protocol. While communication protocols may involve complex communication 3 For implementation in correlated equilibria, see also Vida and Forges (2013).
procedures with multiple rounds in which messages are exchanged, possibly with the help of a trustworthy mediator, the revelation principle applies: any equilibrium outcome of any sender-receiver game with communication can be replicated by a (canonical) communication equilibrium (Forges, 1986; Myerson, 1986 (y y S ( )) 2 (dp (yj ) dp (yj 0 )) 0; 8 ; 0 2 : (IC-S)
The constraint (IC-S) is the sender's truthtelling constraint: the sender has no incentive to misrepresent the state when the mediator commits to randomizing its recommendation according to p yj~ following a report~ . The constraint (IC-R) ensures the receiver's obedience: given the mediation rule fp (:j )g 2 ; and given the sender's truthtelling behavior, the mediator's recommendation re…nes the receiver's belief about the realized state. Then (IC-R) simply states that whenever the mediator recommends action y, the receiver's optimal action given her updated beliefs over the state is indeed y. The particular form of (IC-R)
follows from the fact that, with quadratic payo¤s, the decision maker's optimal action given her beliefs equals the expected state. A mediation rule that simultaneously satis…es (IC-R) and (IC-S) is called incentive compatible.
We are interested in mediation rules that maximize the ex-ante welfare of the receiver.
We refer to a mediation rule as unimprovable for a player, if there is no incentive compatible mediation rule that yields a higher ex-ante expected payo¤ for that player. An optimal mediation rule is thus an incentive compatible mediation rule that is unimprovable for the receiver. Our quadratic setup allows also a simple informational interpretation of optimal mediation rules. Indeed, given the receiver's behavior (IC-R) and the functional form of the receiver's preferences (1), the receiver's payo¤ coincides with her residual variance after listening to the mediator's recommendation. Therefore optimal mediation rules also maximize the amount of information that is transmitted, when the informativeness of a signal is measured in terms of its expected residual variance.
We are particularly interested in a class of sender-receiver games where optimal mediation can be achieved through brief conversations. To be speci…c, we de…ne a brief conversation as a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of a game in which the sender sends a single, costless message observed by the receiver who then takes an action. That is, a brief conversation is the Nash equilibrium of a one-shot, face-to-face, unmediated cheap talk game. Formally, a brief conversation is characterized by (i.) the sender's communication rule ( ) : ! M which speci…es the probability of sending message m 2 M conditional on observing state , (ii.) the receiver's response y(m) : M ! Y which maps messages into actions and (iii.) the receiver's belief function g( j m) : M ! which states the posterior probability of after observing message m. In a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium, the communication rule is optimal for the sender given the receiver's response, the receiver's response is optimal for the receiver given the belief function and the belief function is derived from the communication rule using Bayes'rule whenever possible.
Analysis
We start by deriving an alternative representation of the equilibrium payo¤s induced by a communication equilibrium. To this end, let U S ( ) be the sender's interim payo¤ when the state is , and V S and V R the ex-ante expected payo¤s of the sender and the receiver in a given communication equilibrium. As in GHPS, for any incentive compatible M , de…ned by
2 dp (yj ) be the equilibrium expected decision and variance of the decision. Quadratic payo¤s are convenient as knowledge of y( ) and 2 ( ) su¢ ces to obtain the state-dependent payo¤s for any mediation rule.
Indeed, one immediately has
In principle, knowledge of both values y( ) and 2 ( ) would be required to obtain U S ( ) ;
, and knowledge of the functions y and 2 would be necessary to deduce V S and V R .
However, the restrictions imposed on the set of equilibrium payo¤s by (IC-S) and (IC-R)
imply that, for games with quadratic payo¤s, interim and ex-ante payo¤s can be obtained solely on the basis of the state-contingent average decision y ( ) ; 2 [0; 1].
Lemma 1 Let M be an incentive compatible mediation rule that induces in equilibrium y( )
where, letting I [0;^ ] be the characteristic function of the set [0;^ ], we have
Lemma 1 provides expressions for U S ( ) ; V S and V R as a¢ ne functionals of the average decision y without explicit recourse to either 2 or to any additional information of the mechanism M . Lemma 1 is analogous to well known results in mechanism design with quasilinear utility and convex type spaces: if y( ) plays the role of an "allocation" and 2 ( ) (which enters additively in U S ( )) plays the role of a type-dependent transfer, then an application of the envelope theorem to (IC-S) implies that U S ( ) can be obtained from 4 The characteristic function of the set A; I A , is such that I A (x) = 1 if x 2 A and I A (x) = 0 otherwise.
knowledge of the interim payo¤ of one type and the entire allocation y( ); 2 [0; 1]. Under mediation, however, we must also ensure that the receiver is obedient, i.e. (IC-R) must also hold. Lemma 1 shows that this additional constraint eliminates the degree of freedom in specifying the interim payo¤ to a …xed sender's type. That is, knowledge of the "allocation"
y su¢ ces to compute both interim and ex-ante expected payo¤s. Note, however, that Lemma 1 remains silent on the set of implementable y. For example, the con ‡ict of interest may be so severe that only a babbling equilibrium can be sustained (and thus the set of implementable y is a singleton), which nevertheless would still satisfy (2), (3) and (4).
Interim and ex-ante payo¤s under mediation.
In principle, if the space of implementable y is su¢ ciently rich, one may conjecture that knowledge of U S ( ) for some type is not enough to derive U S ( 0 ) for some other type 0 , and would also be insu¢ cient to infer the ex-ante welfare of the sender and the receiver. In other words, if the set of mediation rules is su¢ ciently rich one would expect that mediation rules that exhibit the same local behavior, by inducing the same U S ( ) for some type ; may have widely di¤erent global properties and thus generate di¤erent ex-ante payo¤s. By contrast, the following proposition characterizes a class of sender-receiver games in which local behavior univocally determines the global welfare properties of any incentive compatible mediation rule. For the remainder of this paper let h( ) = f ( )= (1 F ( )) and r( ) = f ( )=F ( ) be the hazard rate and reversed hazard rate of the distribution F ( ).
Proposition 1 Suppose that, for some ; 2 R; y S ( ) takes one of the following forms
(i) If either (6) or (7) holds, then for any two mediation rules M and M 0 we have
where i = 0 if y S ( ) satis…es (6), while i = 1 if y S ( ) satis…es (7).
(ii) If either (8) or (9) holds, then for any two mediation rules M and M 0 we have
where i = 0 if y S ( ) satis…es (8), while i = 1 if y S ( ) satis…es (9).
We can interpret Proposition 1 as a re…nement of Lemma 1. Lemma 1 shows that knowledge of the function y is su¢ cient to compute ex-ante and interim payo¤s for any incentive compatible M . Nevertheless, the functional di¤erence in the linear functionals de…ning (2), (3) and (4) implies that two average decisions y and y 0 that induce the same U S ( ) for some type may very well yield di¤erent ex-ante payo¤s. Adding more structure to our model, however, can lead to an equivalence between local interim payo¤s and global ex-ante payo¤s. For instance, if y S ( ) can be written as (6) or (7), then a linear relation exists between the expected payo¤ to the receiver and the payo¤ to the sender at an extreme type for any incentive compatible mediation rule, while if either (8) Similar reasoning shows that E y( )K S(1) ( ) and E [ y( )K R ( )] are linearly related if (7) holds. Conversely, if (8) 
is constant if (9) holds. Again, as E [ y( )] is constant over the space of mediation rules then either case would imply (11).
We note that both (6) and (7) hold if the sender's preferred decision is an a¢ ne function of the state and the state is uniformly distributed. 5 This includes the leading example in CS, which has been the workhorse model in applications involving cheap talk communication.
Indeed, the main studies of optimal mediation in CS-type of games all consider this "uniform- an optimal mediation rule maximizes U S (0) and (iii) an optimal mediation rule maximizes
The observation that optimal mediation maximizes U S (0) is exploited by GHPS to characterize the optimal mediation rule for the constant bias case (i.e. when a = 1, b 6 = 0):
Interestingly, as long as a > 1=2 a sender's optimal mediation rule must also lead to the maximum payo¤ for the sender at the extremes of the type space, as well as when computing the sender's payo¤ at an ex-ante stage.
We end this section with two caveats regarding Proposition 1. First, the equivalence (10) establishes a bijection in terms of payo¤s, not decisions or even average decisions. That is, if either (6) or (7) holds, then di¤erent mediation rules that yield the same expected utility for the receiver (and thus for either the lowest or highest type of sender) may induce totally di¤erent decisions. This is simple to see by noting that in the constant bias-uniform speci…cation and for the range of biases in which a three partition equilibrium is feasible, one can construct a mediation rule that induces either the babbling equilibrium or the three partition equilibrium with …xed probabilities and such that the expected payo¤ to the sender is the same at the extreme types as the two partition cheap talk equilibrium. Clearly, however, average decisions cannot coincide under both communication rules. Second, either (6) or (7) are only su¢ cient for the existence of a bijection between U S (0) or U S (1) and V R , as we don't incorporate information about the set of implementable y. For instance, a bijection would trivially follow when the con ‡ict of preferences between sender and receiver is so severe that any incentive compatible mediation rule implements a single decision.
Art of Brevity
We now turn our attention to optimal mediation rules, and study when they involve brief conversations. For the cases that satisfy (6) or (7) with > 1=2, Proposition 1 establishes that M is optimal if and only if the sender's payo¤ in state^ = i 2 f0; 1g cannot be improved by any other mediation rule. Clearly, U S (i) 0 and U S (i) = 0 if and only if the receiver selects the sender's preferred decision when his type is i. The next proposition describes a class of games that satisfy (6) or (7) and admit a brief conversation where the receiver selects the sender's preferred decision at an extreme type, and this brief conversation must then be optimal.
Proposition 2 Suppose that either
or
Then, there exists a brief conversation that is unimprovable for the receiver. Importantly, this equilibrium induces an in…nite number of di¤erent decisions, where y = 0 is an accumulation point if (12) holds, and y = 1 is an accumulation point if (13) holds.
A notable feature of (12) and (13) is that they require full alignment between sender and receiver at some extreme type. 6 Thus Proposition 2 rules out the sender-receiver games studied in CS where preferred decisions of sender and receiver never coincide. These types of games, with an in…nite type-and action-space and where the bias b( ) may vanish or even change sign, have been studied by Gordon (2010) who characterizes communication equilibria and provides conditions for the existence of in…nite equilibria.
The logic behind Proposition 2 can be seen in two steps. First, the existence of a state of full alignment implies in our case that an in…nite equilibrium exists. This is not immediate as
Alonso (2007) and Gordon (2010) show that even if the bias vanishes at some state only …nite 6 Alternatively, the point of alignment may be some interior 0 ; where ( This implies that an in…nite equilibrium guarantees that the receiver selects the sender's (and receiver's) preferred decision at some of point of alignment. Then (12) or (13) guarantee that there is a unique point of alignment, which occurs at an extreme type. For instance, (12) implies that y S ( ) > for > 1, thus the only point of congruence is at = 0 implying that the in…nite equilibrium must necessarily have the sender of type = 0 inducing decision y = 0. As this equilibrium maximizes the sender'payo¤ at = 0, it must also be optimal for the receiver. Therefore, when (12) or (13) There are other well known cases where brief conversations are optimal. First, when the con ‡ict of interest between the sender and the receiver is extreme, either because the di¤erence between preferred actions is large for states that are very likely 7 or because the sender's preferred decision decreases with the state, then the receiver cannot do better than simply choosing her preferred uninformed decision. In this case, optimal conversations are necessarily brief as nothing can be credibly communicated. The equilibria described in Proposition 2, however, always involve in ‡uential communication and the receiver strictly bene…ts from the sender's recommendation. Second, a more subtle example is presented in GHPS were they show that in the leading example of CS, when the constant bias b satis…es b = 1=(2N 2 ) for some integer N; the most informative C-S equilibrium (which involves N di¤erent decisions) is unimprovable through mediation. That is, the constant bias case admits a non-generic set of cases where brief conversations are optimal. 8 In contrast, applying Proposition 2 one can construct sender-receiver games, as we do in Section 4.1, for which all games have a brief conversation that is optimal.
It is instructive to contrast the …ndings in the literature on optimal mediation in CS- We …nd however that for a state-dependent con ‡ict of interest, the gains from mediation depend not only on the magnitude of the con ‡ict of interest (as given by the expected bias), 7 For instance, it is well known that for the leading example in CS, no in ‡uential communication is condition is compatible with a unifomly small bias in [0; 1]. 8 As we noted in Corollary 1, the leading example in CS satis…es (10) . The cases with b = 1=(2N 2 ) are optimal as the sender at = 0 obtains his preferred decision. 9 More generally, Ivanov (2013) provides a simple su¢ cient condition for information transmission to be possible in sender-receiver games.
but also on the shape of the bias b( ). Indeed, (12) imposes no upper limit on the value of while the expected con ‡ict increases without bound as increases. The key di¤erence, however, with the constant bias case is that in spite of an increased average con ‡ict, full alignment at an extreme type persists and in ‡uential communication remains feasible.
Brief conversations, Uncertainty and the Quality of Communication
While the cheap talk setting of CS has found wide acceptance as a model of communication under con ‡icting preferences, applications have generally restricted attention to the "uniform-quadratic" example as expressions for the payo¤s in models beyond that case have proven di¢ cult to come by. However, for the class of sender-receiver games characterized in Proposition 2 we can explicitly compute the ex-ante payo¤ to the receiver under an optimal communication equilibrium.
Proposition 3 For every
If y S ( ) satis…es (12) , then the maximum expected payo¤ of the receiver is
with y 2 (0; 1) the unique solution to
To derive (15) , the proof of the proposition constructs two incentive compatible mechanisms that give the sender the same interim utility at = 0. The …rst mechanism is equivalent to a two partition equilibrium where the sender only reports whether his type exceeds a threshold y . Truthtelling by the sender and obedience by the receiver requires this threshold to satisfy the "arbitrage" condition (16) . To de…ne the second mechanism, M , let M be the mechanism that implements the in…nite equilbrium described in Proposition 2-i, and let M ? be the totally uninformative mediation rule (i.e. the babbling equilibrium).
Then after the sender's report, with probability M issues a recommendation according to M ? , while with probability 1 it follows M . The probability is chosen such that the two partition equilibrium and M yield the same U S (0). Then the linear relation (10) for games where y S ( ) satis…es (6) implies that these two mechanisms must generate the same ex-ante payo¤s for the receiver, from which we deduce that V R satis…es (15) .
We now use (15) to compare V R for di¤erent distributions of the state. To ensure that comparative statics follow from changes in the distribution rather than the bias, in the next corollary we study three examples where the application of (12) leads to a sender's linear preferred decision y S ( ) = a .
Example 1 (exponential).
For each truncated exponential f ( ; ; ) = e =(1 e ); 2 [0; ]; let y S ( ; ; ) be given by (12) . Then f ( ; ; ) converges pointwise to e and y S ( ; ; ) converges pointwise to a as ! 1, where a = . 10 Finally, the limit variance of the truncated exponentials is the variance of an exponential 1= 2 .
Example 2 (linear) Consider a linear pdf that vanishes at the upper bound of the (12), we obtain y S ( ) = a with a = 2 =3. Corollary 2 (i) For a 1, the sender's maximum expected payo¤ is
where x = 2 for the limit of truncated exponentials, x = 3 for the linear case, and x = 4 for the uniform case. 11 (ii) Suppose that
10 See proof of Corollary 2. 11 This expression for the uniform case already appears in Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and
Then the expected bias is highest for the uniform case while it is lowest for the limit of truncated exponentials. However, the maximum expected payo¤ to the sender is highest for the uniform case but lowest for the exponential case.
As expected, (17) shows that the quality of communication improves when the con ‡ict between sender and receiver decreases (i.e. for lower a). More interestingly, the corollary also shows that a shift in the distribution that lowers the expected bias E [y S ( ) ] can actually worsen communication and lower the receiver's expected payo¤ under an optimal communication protocol. Indeed, Corollary 2-ii provides a range of parameter values such that the distribution that leads to the the highest expected payo¤ for the receiver is also the one with the highest expected con ‡ict.
Another way of stating this result is in terms of the receiver's bene…t from communicating with the sender relative to making an uninformed decision. To this end, de…ne the commu- The intuition relies on the two separate roles that uncertainty plays in determining the gains from communication. All equilibria are partitional equilibria where intervals become smaller as one approaches the point of congruence at = 0. Therefore, holding constant the partition of the state space, a shift in the distribution that puts more mass on the states where communication is more detailed can only improve the receiver's payo¤. However, the change in the distribution also changes the "arbitrage condition" determining the equilibrium partition. Suppose that the principal knows that the state lies in [y; y+ ] so that her optimal choice exceeds y by (y; ) = g (y; y + ) y. That is, (y; ) measures the responsiveness of the receiver when she knows that the state lies in an interval of length . Then for a uniform (y; ) does not vary in y while it decreases in y for the linear case. That is, the receiver becomes less responsive under a linear distribution than a uniform. To preserve incentive compatibility by the sender, the size of the intervals must be larger for a linear distribution so that the partitions are coarser under a linear distribution. Then Corollary 2-ii indicates that this second e¤ect dominates for the range of parameters in (18) and a lower expected con ‡ict actually leads to a lower expected payo¤ for the receiver.
Conclusion
The literature has emphasized the bene…cial role of mediation in sender-receiver games where con ‡icting preferences hinder information transmission. We have identi…ed a class of games, however, for which neither lengthy conversations nor mediation enhances the amount of information exchanged in equilibrium. In short, brief conversations are optimal in these cases.
Importantly, the optimality of brief conversations persists even if the average con ‡ict between the sender and the receiver is arbitrarily large. This shows that the value of mediation not only depends on the magnitude of the con ‡ict between the sender and the receiver but also on how this con ‡ict varies over the state space. In our case, as long as the con ‡ict vanishes at one of the extreme points of the state space, brief conversations remain optimal.
Our proof of optimality of brief conversations (Proposition 2) relies on the existence of a one-to-one relation between the sender's interim payo¤s at extreme types and the ex-ante expected payo¤s of the players. This bijection also implies that optimal mediation rules are locally optimal for some sender's type. A natural question is the extent to which this assertion holds true in general. In other words, does an optimal mediation rule necessarily maximize the interim utility of some sender's type? Furthermore, our proofs made no use of the characteristics of the set of implementable average decisions, as we rely instead on properties of the payo¤ functions. Better understanding implementability can further our understanding of the bene…ts of mediation. We leave these two observations for future work.
.
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Let M be an arbitrary incentive compatible mediation mechanism.
We will derive the relations (2), (3) and (4) in three steps. First, we have that Z Y y dp(yj
where in the …rst equality we apply the Fubini-Tonelli Theorem and the second equality follows from (IC-R). Therefore, V R can be written as
where we applied (19) to the third equality and the law of iterated expectations to the last equality. This establishes (4) with K R ( ) = .
Second, as utilities are quadratic and given (19) we immediately have
where we have again applied (19) to the third equality. This establishes (3) with
Third, …xing a probability measure p( j^ ) from the mechanism M; the function
2 dp(yj^ ) has the same smoothness properties as y S ( ). Our assumption that y S ( ) is di¤erentiable and Theorem 2 of Milgrom and Segal (2002) then imply that U S ( ) is absolutely continuous, and for any two states and 0 satis…es the integral representation
Fixing a reference state~ ; integrating by parts, and rearranging we have Proof of Proposition 1: (i) Suppose that (6) holds so that
Conversely, if (7) holds then
so that
Let i = 0 if (6) holds, and i = 1 if (7) holds. Then,
Applying the law of iterated expectations to (IC-R) one readily obtains
Therefore, for any incentive compatible mediation rule we have
S (i) …nite and independent of the mediation mechanism. This establishes (10) . Finally, if > 1=2 then (22) implies that there is a linear and increasing relation between U S (i) and the ex-ante payo¤ to the receiver V R . Therefore, a mediation rule achieves the maximum U S (i) if and only if it maximizes V R .
(ii) If y 0 S ( ) = h ( ) ; then K S(0) can be written as
while if y 0 S ( ) = r ( ) ; then K S(1) can be written as
As average decisions must equal the state (as shown in (21)), then letting i = 0 if (8) is satis…ed, and i = 1 if (9) is satis…ed, we can write
S (i) …nite and independent of the mediation mechanism, from which (11) follows.
Proof of Corollary 1: If y S ( ) = a + b then clearly (6) and (7) are both satis…ed with = 2a: Then (10) implies that if a > 1=4 a mediation rule is optimal if and only if it maximizes U S (i), i 2 f0; 1g: Moreover, as preferred decisions are linear, and applying both (19) and (21) we have
if a > 1=2 we have that optimal mediation rules maximize the interim payo¤ of extreme types, and also the sender's expected payo¤ and, conversely, any mechanism that maximizes the interim payo¤ at an extreme state must necessarily be ex-ante optimal for both the sender and the receiver. and U S (1) = 1. As (13) satis…es (7) and the bound condition on guarantees > 1; then (10) holds and the in…nite equilibrium must be optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3:
To obtain (15) we will use the relation (10) and the fact that the set of implementable y is convex. To see this last point note that for any two incentive compatible M 0 and M 00 ; that induce y 0 and y 00 , a mediation rule that with probability issues recommendations according to M 0 and with probability 1 according to M 00 ;where, importantly, the probability does not vary with the report of the sender, is incentive compatible and induces an average decision y 0 + (1 ) y 00 . Let M replicate the in…nite equilibrium described in Proposition 2 and let M ? replicate the babbling equilibrium (i.e.
under M ? the receiver selects a single decision E [ ] is induced).
We now construct a two partition equilibrium of the cheap talk game when y S is given by (12) . In such equilibrium the sender only discloses whether the state is above or below 
The right hand side of (24) 
Next consider the mediation mechanism M that is a convex combination of M and M ? , that is with probability the mechanism M issues the same recommendation as M ? while with probability 1 it issues the same recommendation as M . We then have
From Proposition 2, under the optimal one-shot equilibrium we have U M S (0) = 0. Moreover, U 
and (26) Now consider the linear case where (12) translates to y S ( ) = 
